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In recent months, Midwestemers have
consistently told pollsters and politicians
that their No. 1 concern is jobs. The
economy's tepid growth rate, coupled
with die downsizing of several major
U.S. corporations, has raised people's
anxiety about job security and future
employment prospects.
At a time of subpar employment growth
in this region and across the nation,
workers are now faced with the uncer-
tain effects of another event. On Aug-
ust 12, the United States, Mexico, and
Canada announced their decision to
create a free-trade zone. The North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which will come up for a
vote in Congress next spring, would
eventually eliminate all tariffs on ship-
ments among the three countries, as
well as remove limits on international
investment, liberalize trade in services,
and protect intellectual property rights.
In many respects, the pact is similar to the
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between
Canada and the United States, which has
been in effect since 1989. Adding Mexico
to the trading bloc appears to have caused
considerably more consternation among
U.S. workers than did FTA, however.
This anxiety stems from the fear that
much lower wages and less stringent
regulations in Mexico will lure American
businesses and jobs there. Job loss was
not a major concern when FTA was
adopted, since wages are no lower in
Canada than in the United States, and
business regulations are generally stiffen
The debate over the economic conse-
quences of NAFTA is expected to inten-
sify over the next few months as the
U.S., Canadian, and Mexican legisla-
tures consider ratification. Proponents
claim that passage would benefit all
three nations by increasing commerce
within the trading bloc. As they see it,
new jobs would be created and wages
and standards of living would rise.
Critics may agree that overall welfare
would be somewhat higher, but they
place more emphasis on the expected
loss of high-paying jobs in specific in-
dustries and regions, as well as on the
adjustment costs of retraining dis-
placed workers.
The latest meeting of the Fourth Dis-
trict Economists' Roundtable, held Oc-
tober 2 at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, offered some reasons for
workers to reevaluate their fears about
NAFTA. Participants were asked to as-
sess how they see the agreement affect-
ing their businesses, with particular em-
phasis on autos, steel, and electronics/
telecommunications — three industries
of great importance to the Midwest
economy. In addition, several outside
experts were invited to present their in-
sights on the economywide and industry-
specific effects of the pact. The group
generally agreed that NAFTA would
have only a minimal impact on worker
displacement. Highlights of the pro-
ceedings are reported below.
• Gains from Trade
According to the traditional view of in-
ternational trade, an increase in the
flow of goods and services across na-
tional boundaries boosts the average
The pending ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement has
many American workers concerned
about job security and future employ-
ment prospects. The fear is that lower
wages and benefits in Mexico will entice
American businesses to dose their doors
and head south. The latest meeting of
the Fourth District Economists' Round-
table focused on the likely effects of the
accord, with particular emphasis on the
Midwest economy. The consensus is
that NAFTA is merely a codification of
the general worldwide trend toward
reducing trade barriers, so its impact
should be minimal.
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sides of the border. Gains in efficiency
and in real income are derived primarily
from nations specializing in those
goods and services they can produce
relatively cheaply, a phenomenon
known as comparative advantage. For
example, suppose that U.S. workers are
more efficient at producing precision
machine tools than electronic compo-
nents, while Mexican workers have
just the opposite relative advantage.
Free trade allows workers in each coun-
try to concentrate on what they do best,
which in this case means that U.S.
workers will produce precision machine
tools and Mexican workers will
manufacture electronic components.
Both consumers and workers benefit
from this system, with consumers en-
joying lower prices and workers engag-
ing in more-productive activities.
NAFTA would expand access to all
three countries' markets by phasing out
tariffs on most goods over the next 10
years. Trade would not be totally unim-
peded, since other barriers are retained
in the form of special provisions re-
stricting commerce in a few protected
industries. Nonetheless, the pact would
provide most businesses with access to
a massive combined market of 370 mil-
lion people and an annual gross domes-
tic product (GDP) of $6.2 trillion.
Daniel Schwanen of Toronto's CD.
Howe Institute presented several strik-
ing examples of how FTA has opened
up Canada's trade with the United
States. For categories of goods in
which tariffs were eliminated, Cana-
dian exports to the United States have
increased at a much faster pace than ex-
ports to other nations. In fact, the rela-
tive gain in sales to our country has oc-
curred even though the U.S. economy
has lagged behind that of most of
Canada's other trading partners. The
stimulative effect of tariff reductions
on exports is also suggested by the fact
that shipments to the United States
have grown for those goods allowed to
enter duty free, but have fallen for
those still subject to tariffs.
Most analyses of NAFTA predict that
real personal income in all three nations
will rise as trade increases. Alan Dear-
dorff, an economics professor at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, presented results
from a study conducted with two of his
colleagues. They predict out real income
will pick up in all three countries during
the 10-year phase-in period, but that the
overall increase is likely to be minimal.
Even for Mexico, which has the most to
gain from the agreement because of its
higher tariffs and less developed econ-
omy, real income should rise only up to 5
percent of GDP. For both the United
States and Canada, die corresponding
figures are just a fraction of 1 percent
• Mitigating Factors
Roundtable participants cited three
reasons for these relatively small gains.
First, existing tariffs are not very high.
Mexican goods coming across our bor-
der are subject to an average tariff of
only around 5 percent, while products
going in the opposite direction are
taxed at only about a 10 percent rate.
By comparison, sales-tax differentials
between some neighboring U.S. states
exceed 5 percentage points.
It is unclear just how responsive trade
flows might be to a relatively modest
reduction in prices. Currently, U.S.
trade with Mexico accounts for roughly
8 percent of our merchandise exports
and 6 percent of imports. Comparable
figures for Canada are one-half of 1
percent and 2 percent, respectively.
Thus, even if trade flows were to
double as a result of NAFTA, the im-
pact on the overall national economies
would still be small.
Second, much of the trade among the
three countries is not subject to tariffs.
About 85 percent of Mexican products
currently enter the United States duty
free, and roughly 80 percent enter Can-
ada duty free.
1 Still, the notion that
trade barriers for manufactured goods are
already low must be qualified by the
recognition that other types of barriers
exist For instance, Mexico imposes im-
port licenses on automobiles, electronics,
and Pharmaceuticals, while the United
States and Canada enforce quotas on
specific goods.
Finally, NAFTA by no means signals
the beginning of trade liberalization.
Rather, in many respects it simply for-
malizes a previously established pos-
ture among the three countries. The bor-
der between Canada and the United
States has traditionally been relatively
open, and FTA opened the door even
further. Mexico dramatically liberal-
ized its economic policy in the mid-
1980s by allowing free markets to
operate in areas where the government
had previously intervened, by deregu-
lating other industries, and by unilat-
erally lowering tariffs and slashing its
import licensing program. In response
to these changes, goods and investment
funds have poured into Mexico. Thus,
it would be a mistake to confuse the ef-
fects of NAFTA with the ramifications
of previous economic policy shifts.
• Midwest Jobs:
Winners and Losers
Probably the most contentious aspect of
NAFTA relates to jobs. Some U.S. labor
organizations have insisted that the
pact could displace up to half a million
American workers. Proponents counter
this concern by listing hundreds of
thousands of new jobs that could be
created as exports expand.
Both of these estimates may be some-
what high, since NAFTA is expected to
bolster trade only marginally. A much-
cited study by economists Gary Hufbauer
and Jeffrey Schott of the Institute for In-
ternational Economics foresees 110,000
displaced workers from increased im-
ports and 240,000 additional jobs from in-
creased exports, or a net gain of about
13O.0O0.
2 Tb put these estimates into
perspective, total U.S. employment has
declined by 550,000 since the economy
peaked in July 1990, while Ohio employ-
ment has slipped by 70,000.FIGURE 1 SHARES OF EXPORTS TO MEXICO
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It is not surprising, then, that labor's pri-
mary concern is not net job loss, but
worker displacement While jobs will
likely be created to replace those lost as a
result of increased trade, the workers who
are laid off will not necessarily fill these
new positions, which may be located in
another region or require very different
skills. Such structural shifts will enhance
the overall competitiveness of the United
States, but possibly at the expense of
workers in industries that lack a compara-
tive advantage over their Mexican
counterparts.
Existing trilateral trade flows offer
some indication of the types of busi-
nesses that would benefit from liberal-
ized trade, particularly with Mexico.
The United States accounts for 70 per-
cent of Mexico's total trade. However,
the four states that make up the Fourth
Federal Reserve District —Kentucky,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia
— account for only 4.4 percent of that
figure. The goods we do ship to Mex-
ico to a large extent reflect the region's
comparative advantage. For example,
32 percent of Ohio's exports to Mexico
comprise industrial machinery and com-
puters, 22 percent of Pennsylvania's ship-
ments are primary metal products, most
of West Virginia's exports are chemical
products, and Kentucky primarily ships
fabricated metals and industrial
machinery.
Comparing the share of Fourth District
exports to Mexico to the U.S. share
reveals that this region excels in pri-
mary metals, industrial machinery, and
chemical products (see figure 1).
Another encouraging sign for Mid-
westemers is that the District's share of
total U.S. exports to Mexico has more
than doubled over the last four years in
these three key industries.
But jobs may be affected by factors
other than a change in the level and
composition of trade flows. Perhaps a
more pressing concern of Midwest
workers — indeed, of all American
workers — is that lower wages and
benefits in Mexico may encourage U.S.
firms to locate their manufacturing
facilities there. Hourly manufacturing
compensation costs in Mexico are only
one-seventh the U.S. rate, and health
care costs and pension liabilities are
also substantially lower (see figure 2).
It is not clear to what extent American
companies will take advantage of this
situation, since labor costs are only one
of the factors firms consider when locat-
ing facilities. The quality of a nation's
labor force, access to maikets, the condi-
tion of highways and other public infra-
structure, and the cost of materials also
weigh heavily in the decision. Most of
the Roundtable participants indicated that
their firms have no immediate plans to
establish facilities south of the border if
NAFTA is ratified, though some noted
that Mexico may be an attractive alterna-
tive to the Far East because of its prox-
imity and its increasingly stable invest-
ment climate.
Professor Deardorff offered estimates
of employment changes across indus-
tries that would result from both shifts
in trade flows and direct U.S. invest-
ment in Mexico. Employment in the in-
dustrial machinery and chemicals sec-
tors is expected to see the biggest rise
if NAFTA is approved, while transpor-
tation equipment would be one of the
major losers. Even so, his estimate of
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is quite modest, at only about one-half
of 1 percent of existing employment.
In addition to the overview of NAFTA,
the Roundtable also heard comments
from outside experts about the state of
three industries that play a key role in
the Midwest economy: autos, steel, and
electronics/telecommunications. Below,
we present a synopsis of their reports.
• Autos
Marc Scheinman, from Pace University
and The Economist Intelligence Unit,
noted that significant investment poten-
tial lies south of the border for the U.S.
auto industry, which is heavily concen-
trated in Ohio and Michigan. Approval
of NAFTA means that the Mexican
government would allow maquiladoras,
which are classified as foreign busi-
nesses, to boost their direct domestic
sales immediately. Eventually, all trade
barriers would be phased out through-
out both the auto and automotive parts
industries.
Such liberalization will undoubtedly
help Mexico's auto sector, which is cur-
rently operating at capacity, to meet the
surging Mexican demand for small cars.
Scheinman estimated that Mexico's
auto production would have to double
by the year 2000 just to accommodate
the nation's consumers, with sales ex-
pected to skyrocket 140 percent over
the decade. Of every three Mexican
cars produced, two will likely be con-
sumed domestically. This should help
ease American workers' concern that
Mexico will flood the U.S. market with
inexpensive new cars, particularly
since vehicles produced there will not
be free of tariffs until well into the
twenty-first century.
Another factor that could mitigate the ef-
fects of NAFTA is that trade agreements
liberalizing foreign content requirements
are already in place. Ratification would
simply speed up the changes in such re-
quirements and further open opportunities
for auto industry expansion, particularly
in Mexico's interior. According to Schein-
man, both Nissan and Volkswagen have
plans to invest heavily in Mexico if
NAFTA is signed. Fortunately, this ex-
pansion should not affect U.S. jobs. Not
only will transportation costs remain high
enough to hamper a surge of Mexican ex-
ports, but the quality of Mexico's automo-
tive labor force is currently not competi-
tive with that of the United States.
• Steel
For the steel industry, NAFTA will
probably not change the direction of
North American trade, according to
Donald Bamett, an industry consultant.
He reported that domestic producers
are in the midst of a major restructur-
ing, the result of new "mini-mills"
opening throughout the country. Be-
cause of a less labor-intensive produc-
tion process, these smaller plants are
able to produce a limited line of
products much more cheaply than can
the larger, integrated mills.
On the down side, the quality of the
mini-mills' products is still not what it
should be, so demand is limited. As
this situation improves over time, so
will these facilities' competitiveness.
Indeed, by the end of the decade, esti-
mates suggest that mini-mills may ac-
count for 10 percent of domestic steel
capacity. In the interim, we will see a
race to reduce costs between the major
steel producers and their new rivals on
the domestic scene.Competition from the mini-mills and
emerging new technologies have already
registered a tremendous impact in reduc-
ing labor's share of steel production
costs. A good example is labor's share of
the cost per ton of flat-rolled steel, which
is expected to drop from about 30 percent
in 1991 to 25 percent in 2001. As this
component of steel costs diminishes, so
does the advantage of moving manufac-
turing facilities to Mexico. What's more,
Mexico has no advantage over the
United States in the cost of raw materials
and other inputs into the steel-making
process.
• Electronics/Telecommunications
The electronics industry supports
NAFTA, according to the paper pre-
sented by Glyn Finley of the Electronic
Industries Association. Tariffs on most
trade within this sector would be elimi-
nated by January 1,1994, and any
remaining tariffs would be lifted within
five years. This should increase U.S.
exports to Mexico by enhancing our
competitiveness.
Industry leaders are disappointed that the
agreement makes no provision for tariff
reductions in the telecommunications
area. Nonetheless, it does recognize that
the ability to move and manage informa-
tion freely within and across national bor-
ders is necessary for effective trade and
economic growth. Though the accord
falls short of industry expectations, it
takes a step in the right direction by
establishing a process to enhance the
telecommunication linkages between
Mexico and the United States.
• Conclusion
NAFTA has been heralded as a major
step in unleashing the combined competi-
tive powers of the three North American
nations. Uniting the economies of Can-
ada, Mexico, and the United States
through duty-free trade would form the
world's largest trading bloc and would
raise the standard of living in all three
countries. The benefits will spring from
each nation's ability to focus on those
goods and services for which they have a
comparative advantage. But as workers
move from less productive to more
productive industries, jobs will inevitably
be reshuffled.
In the United States, and particularly in
the Midwest, many workers are con-
cerned that NAFTA may be their ticket
to the unemployment line. Participants
at the latest meeting of the Fourth
Federal Reserve District Rouhdtable
see it another way. While they recog-
nize that reducing trade barriers dis-
places workers, they generally agree
that NAFTA's impact on both job loss
and overall benefits would be modest
In their view, the agreement is primari-
ly a means of solidifying rather than in-
itiating the process of opening national
borders to trade and investment.
The fortunes of particular workers will
depend on both the competitiveness of
their industries and their ability to meet
the skill requirements of the new jobs
that will be created. One of Hie major
issues legislators will face as they con-
sider ratification is the adequacy of
worker retraining programs intended to
prepare workers for this transition. But
regardless of NAFTA's fate on Capitol
Hill, Midwest businesses and workers
will continue to enjoy the benefits—
and to face the challenges—of compet-
ing in a more open world economy.
• Footnotes
1. See Steven Globerman and Maureen
Bader, "A Perspective on Trilateral
Economic Relations," in Steven Globerman,
ed.. Continental Accord: North American
Economic Integration. Vancouver The
Fraser Institute, 1991, pp. 133-74.
2. See Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott,
North American Free Trade: Issues and
Recommendations. Washington, D.C: Insti-
tute for International Economics, 1992.
3. These figures may understate the linkage
between Mexico and the Midwest, since
goods that are shipped first to border states
for processing or storage before going on to
Mexico (including autos manufactured in the
Midwest) are not reflected in the export data.
Texas, for example, ships more goods to
Mexico than it actually produces, because
the state is a primary staging area for supply-
ing Mexico's maquiladora enterprises.
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the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of
the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.Chronology of Events Leading up to the North American Free Trade Agreement
February 1991 The United States, Mexico, and Canada agree to begin negotiations for a free trade agreement.
June 1991 Formal negotiations begin.
August 12,1992 An agreement is reached, and a team of experts and lawyers from all three nations continue to ham-
mer out wording that will ensure effective and smooth implementation of the provision.
September 18,1992 President Bush formally notifies Congress of his intent to enter into the agreement
October 7,1992 President Bush, Mexican President Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney meet in San
Antonio to discuss plans for implementing NAFTA. Following the meeting, the trade ministers who
negotiated the accord initial the document.
What's Next? The next step in the ratification process will be the formal signing of the agreement by the three
heads of state. In the United States, NAFTA falls under the fast-track procedures for congressional
review and approval of international trade agreements. (The 90-day notification period began on
September 18, when the President formally advised Congress of his intent to enter into the agree-
ment. The signing can occur on or after December 17,1992, but no later than June 1,1993. At any
time thereafter, the President may transmit the implementing legislation to Congress, which must
act upon it within 90 session days (this could span up to eight months).
SOURCE: Fact Sheet. "San Antonio Meeting and Initialing of the North American Free Trade Agreement." The White House, October 7,1992.
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